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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Declaratory Judgment action seeking construe-
tion of the provisions of Sections 39-1-35 and 39-3-2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by all parties 
and were argued before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor on 
December 15, 1978. The Court entered its Order on February 
2, 1979, granting defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 
and denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the Order entered on February 
2, 1979, by Judge G. Hal Taylor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents basically accept the statement of facts sub-
mitted by Appellant except for the assertion that "several 
other agencies, organizations and governmental subdivisions 
had similar policies of supplementing pay of individuals on 
military leave." As to governmental subdivisions or agencies 
this is obviously not true in the State of Utah and respond-
ents respectfully take issue with such allegation. 
POINT I 
WASATCH FRONT IS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 
39-l-35 OR 39-3-2, uTAH CODE Affi.OTATED, 1953. 
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Appellant argues that employees of Wasatch Front Regional 
Council are not state employees for purposes of either sec-
tions 39-l-35 or 39-3-2 of the Utah Code. (See Point III 
of Appellant's Brief) Section 11-13-1 of the Utah Code 
specifically states that a separate legal entity formed 
pursuant to the Act (Utah Interlocal Cooperation Act) is 
deemed a "political subdivision of the State." 
Appellant refers to Section 11-13-3 and specifically 
the definition of "public agency" and then asserts that since 
that term includes all political subdivisions of the State I 
that respondents are asserting that the employees of a "pub· 
lie agency" are "state employees" and that this is an absurc 
result since it would make employees of all "public agencies' 
state employees. 
This is a case of setting up a "straw man" so it can be 
demolished with no reference to the actual argument advancec 
by respondents. 
Since Wasatch Front is specifically defined to be a 
"political subdivision of the State," employees thereof are 
either "state employees," or employees of a "political sub· 
division of the State." The member organizations of Wasatc~ 
Front are "political subdivisions" of the State and in this 
case, either municipalities or counties. It is logical to 
-2-
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assume that the employees of Wasatch Front would fall into 
the category of either "municipal" or "county employees." 
The fact is that Section 11-13-24 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
seems to imply this by stating that officers and employees 
of contracting agencies "shall be deemed officers and em-
ployees of said public agencies." In the case of Wasatch 
Front, the "contracting agencies" are either municipalities 
(cities) or counties and thus subject to the obligations 
imposed on cities and counties including specifically the 
requirement to pay military leave pay. To conclude other-
wise would lead to an "absurd" result. For instance, if a 
city desired to relieve itself of certain responsibilities 
it could presumably enter into a contract with another "pub-
lic agency" under the Interlocal Act and employ that agency 
to perform city services without the necessity of performing 
any requirements or responsibilities the city felt were burden-
some, onerous or otherwise disadvantageous to the city. Cer-
tainly the Legislature in adopting the Interlocal Cooperation 
Act did not intend it to be a vehicle for "public agencies" 
to circumvent the law and legal requirements otherwise ap-
plicable to a "public agency." 
Respondents submit that employees of Wasatch Front either 
qualify as "state employees" by virtue of Section 11-13-1 or 
they fall into the category of employees of a "city or county" 
-3-
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and they would in either event be entitled to the benefits 
of "military leave" as provided in Section 39-1-35 or 39-3-11 
I 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. I 
Wasatch Front Regional Council is funded by tax revenues I 
of cities and counties within the geographical area of 
Wasatch Front. Federal grant in aid money is received as 
well under certain federal aid programs. Respondents soo-
mit that so long as the Board of Directors are made up of 
city and county officials and funding is supplied by cities 
and counties, there is no justification for a finding that 
appellant is not responsible to pay military leave pay as 
specified in Section 39-1-35 or Section 39-3-2. 
POINT II 
SECTION 39-3-2 APPLIES TO THE NATIONAL GUARD AS 
WELL AS THE OTHER RESERVE COMPONENTS. 
Appellant mistakenly asserts that the National Guard is 
not a "reserve component" or that in some way the Legisla-
ture intended to create a distinction between the coverage 
contemplated in Section 39-3-2 for the "organized reserve" 
as it applies to other than state employees and the more 
restrictive coverage afforded in Section 39-1-35. 
As can be seen by a simple reading of Section 39-1-35, 
I 
Section was to encourage I enacted in 1917, the intent of that 
membership in the National Guard by state employees. At 
-4-
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that time in our history the National Guard was for all 
intents and purposes the "reserve," at least as far as 
this State was concerned. It was also just prior to entry 
by the U. S. in World War I when national mobilization was 
beginning. This was one year after the National Congress 
passed the National Defense Act of 1916, which among other 
things provided for funding of the National Guard by the 
United States and provided for its inclusion as a "reserve" 
force. (See 39 Stat. at Large 166) 
In 1955 the Legislature obviously recognized the inequity 
which then existed of granting military leave only to state 
employees who belonged to the National Guard and apparently 
decided to extend the benefit of military leave to not only 
state employees but to county and municipal employees as 
well, and to extend the benefit to members of the "organized 
reserve of the u.s. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines." 
Since the obvious intent of the Legislature in 1955 was 
to extend the scope of military leave and its application, 
it is not reasonable to conclude as appellant asserts, that 
the Legislature did not intend for 39-3-2 to apply to the 
National Guard, as well as the "organized reserve." If 
appellant were correct, it would mean that a National Guards-
man employed by a city or county would not be entitled to 
-5-
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military leave while a fellow employee who was a reservist 
would. This is not reasonable and plainly was not the in-
tent of the Legislature. 
Ever since the National Defense Act of 1916, the National I 
Guard has been funded by the U.S. Government, has trained I 
pursuant to requirements originating with the u.s. Government I 
and has been considered within the terms "organized reserve" I 
or "reserve component" of the United States. This has been 
formalized by definition in the United States Code since 
July 9, 1952, when the definition now found in 10 U.S.C., 
was adopted. (See 66 Stat. at Large 483.) 
Obviously, the Utah State Legislature was aware that the 
National Guard of the State of Utah, both Army and Air were 
included within the category of the "organized reserve of 
the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines" when they enacte,: 
Section 39-3-2. To conclude otherwise is totally unrealisti: 
In 10 U.S.C., 261 the Reserve Components of the United 
States are designated and this designation includes both we 
"Army National Guard of the United States" and "the Air 
National Guard of the United States." These terms are de-
fined in 10 U.S.C. 101 and clearly provide that members of 
the National Guard, both Army and Air are also concurrentlY 
members of the "Reserve Components." 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There is no difference between a National Guardsman and 
a reservist as far as training standards, pay and allowances, 
promotion standards or uniform requirements. The only dis-
tinction is that a guardsman is technically under control 
of the Governor while a reservist is not. To conclude that 
the Legislature in enacting 39-3-2 intended to restrict its 
application to "members of the organized reserves" without 
including the National Guard, or to in any way restrict its 
application is not realistic. They obviously were extending 
the benefits of military leave, not restricting it as ap-
pellant's position would effectively do. 
Appellant is too concerned with trying to distinguish be-
tween the language of a statute and terms then used to desig-
nate reserve organizations with today's definition of the 
"reserve components." Regardless of name, the Reserve Com-
ponents as defined today in 10 U.S.C. 261, all had their 
predecessors, who were designated somewhat differently but 
who had essentially the same function. It is also obvious 
that these "reserve organizations" were all intended to be 
encompassed within the term used by the State Legislature 
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POINT III 
THE PROVISIONS OF 39-1-35 AND 39-3-2 CAN BE 
HARMONIZED. 
In addition to the argument set out in Point II of this 
brief, respondents allege further that there is no conflict 
in fact between Sections 39-3-2 and 39-1-35. Section 39-~2 
is merely an amplification of 39-1-35 and extends the cover· 
1 
age already a part of the law to employees of cities or 
counties and to "reservists" as opposed to only state em-
ployees who belonged to the National Guard. 
Appellant's argument about giving both statutes "meaning" 
thus defeating benefits to guardsmen employed by cities or 
counties was obviously not intended and is an unreasonable 
interpretation. The past practices of Wasatch Front show 
this to be the case since they have paid military leave to 
guardsmen and even their new clearly erroneous policy of 
paying the pay differential does not distinguish between 
guardsmen and "reservists." This Court has commented on 
the weight to be given an administrative determination when 
a question of statutory interpretation is presented in the 
case of Salt Lake City vs. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738 
(1977): 
Nevertheless, we further observe that 
the correctness of the trial court's 
decision also finds support in this 
-8-
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additional proposition: that in case 
of any uncertainty or ambiguity in a 
statute, a reasonable administrative 
interpretation and practice should be 
given some weight, and this is particu-
larly true when such an administrative 
intrepetation and practice has persisted 
for a long time without any legislative 
correction or change. 
The Court then went on to state with reference to the long 
practice followed by Salt Lake County in this case: 
As we have observed in other fields of 
the law, if there is to be any abrupt 
about-face in policy, that should be 
done by the legislature rather than 
by the county officials adding in the 
self interest of the county. 
See also Allison v. u.s., 301 F.2d 670 (1962) and cases 
cited therein on this proposition. 
During the recent General Session of the Utah State Legis-
lature a bill to amend both Sections 39-1-35 and 39-3-2 was 
before the House of Representatives as House Bill No. 18. 
(See Appendix for copy of Substitute House Bill No. 18 for 
reference.) The main thrust of this Bill was to provide for 
payment of only the differential between military pay and 
the pay otherwise due the employee from his regular employ-
ment as a state, county or municipal employee referred to as 
"full pay." This Bill was debated extensively and soundly 
defeated by the House of Representatives. The Legislature 
did not see fit to remove any alleged "ambiguity" between 
the two statutes in question. 
-9-
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While it can be argued that the enactment of Section 
39-3-2 renders Section 39-1-35 somewhat unnecessary, it 
does not render that section inapplicable, nor does it con- 1 
flict. It is obvious that 39-3-2 was not intended to con-
flict with 39-1-35 and to adopt .'-l.ppellant's theory as urged 
in its argument creates an unreasonable effect and theoreti-1 
cally creates a discriminatory effect which was obviously 
not intended as already urged. 
While the Supreme Court of Utah has not had an opport~-
ity to speak out as yet with respect to 39-1-35 and 39-3-2 
it did have such an opportunity with respect to 39-3-1 in 
the Critchlow v. Monson, 102 U. 378,131 P.2d 794 (B42): 
One of the apparent objects of the statute 
as well as that of similar statutes in other 
states, is to have a position or job open to 
the ones who are compelled to leave them tempor-
arily because of the call to the armed forces. 
Among other things, the act was designed to 
aid morale. . . • The plaintiff has mis-
conceived the objectives of the act. (p. 802, 
Pacific Rptr. cite.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
It has long been the law of this state that if there is 
a lack of clarity in a statute the entire statute should be 
looked to and to the for which the statute was 
I 
I purposes 
sought to accomplish. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake Coun!Y, su:l 
op cit. The Utah Supreme Court observed: 
An even more fundamental rule of statutory 
interpretation helpful here is that the 
-10-
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statute should be looked at in its en-
tirety and in accordance with the pur-
pose which was sought to be accomplished. 
(Citing authority) 
POINT IV 
"FULL PAY" AS USED IN SECTIONS 39-1-35 AND 39-3-2 
MEANS THE PAY OTHERWISE DUE THE EHPLOYEE BY THE PUB-
LIC ENTITY WITHOUT ANY REDUCTION FOR PAY RECEIVED 
FROH MILITARY SERVICE. 
As already commented upon in Point III, in the recent 
General Session of the Legislature in 1979, the House of 
Representatives rejected H.B. 18 which would have reduced 
the pay entitlement of public employees of the State and 
its subdivisions during periods of military leave from 
"full pay" to only the differential between the military 
pay and their regular full time pay. (See Appendix for copy 
of House Journal of February 9, 1979 detailing this action.) 
Again, past precedent has been for public agencies of 
the State to pay "full pay" to members of the National Guard 
and the Reserve Components while in the status of military 
leave. The policy of the State of Utah since prior to 1965 
has been to pay "full pay" in addition to any military pay 
the employee receives and to grant eleven working days of 
military leave to state employees. (R. 37-38) 
Appellant's reference in Point V of its brief to the 
Militia Act of 1917, the Amendment of 1919 and to present Sec-
tions 39-1-51 and 39-1-52, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the 
various prohibitions regarding double payment demonstrate 
-11-
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a basic misunderstanding of what the egislature intended 
I 
by these sections. The Legislature was merely making referer.j 
to the fact that when the National Guard or "militia" was in I 
a status where payment was made for their service by the I 
federal government, no state payment for that service was 
to be made. This is the distinction between "state duty" 
and duty in a federal "active duty for training" status 
which has long been recognized. Nearly all National Guard 
service and active duty is on a regularly scheduled basis 
and is conducted under provisions of 32 u.s.c. 502, 503 or 
504. Payment is made for this service by the federal govern· 
ment. 
On infrequent emergency situations the National Guard 
may be called into state service for such emergencies as 
fire, floods or insurrection. In these instances they 
would be compensated by state funds. Thus the prescription 
of the sections cited by appellant is to guard against 
double payment when the guard is in a federal status. It 
has nothing to do with an employee of the State who is grante' 
military leave pay as an inducement to belong to a reserve 
component. 
That the Legislature understood the distinction between 
double pay for service and mi 1 i tary leave pay for state ern· 
ployees is obvious since the same Legislature enacted both 
-12-
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Sections in 1917. (Section 43, Chapter 99, Laws of Utah 
1917 and Section 27, Chapter 99, Laws of Utah 1917, re-
specti ve1y. ) 
Thus, Appellant's argument is totally frivolous and 
should be rejected. 
As pointed out previously, the policy of the State of 
Utah and all cities and counties who have paid military leave, 
historically has been to pay the employee his "full salary" 
for that time involved in annual training referred to variously 
as "su.'lli!\er camp," "annual encampments," "active duty for train-
ing," etc., up to a maximum of 15 days annually. Traditionally, 
this payment has not been reduced, as Appellant urges, to re-
flect the pay differential between "full" military pay and pay 
due from the employer. This universal interpretation by public 
agencies generally of the plain statutory language is reason-
able and should be strongly considered by this Court in review-
ing this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that the ruling of the Dis-
trict Court granting Respondents' Hotion for Summary Judgment 
should be sustained by this Court. The provisions of Sections 
39-1-35 or 39-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, do not conflict 
and it is apparent that Section 39-3-2 was intended to amplify 
and extend the benefits of military leave to members of reserve 
-13-
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components generally rather than only to State employees 
belonging to the National Guard. 
Respondents further submit that Wasatch Front Regional 
Council is an organization of cities and counties and en-
joys no immunity from the lawful obligation of cities and 
counties to pay military leave pay to its employees who 
belong to the "organized reserve." 
Respondents therefore urge this Court to finally declare 
that Appellant must compensate Respondent John Ray acEvilly 
and others similarly situated for their full pay otherwise 
I 
due during periods of military leave in addition to any mil1·l 
tary pay entitlement. 
PAUL COTRO-MANES f~ 7~ 
Attorney for McEvilly 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
_. -C>---~ / - /1 /;; ~ '-( 
By/ ~.-c:,:_.,'"'L ef. /j·Z::·<--
LELAND D . FORD \, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing Respon 
dents 1 Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Harold G. Chns, 
and Paul C. Droz, Attorneys for Appellant, 700 Continental 1 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this 9th day of July, 11 
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H. B. No. 18 By Lee W. Farnsworth 
7 








SECTION 39-3-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY 
CHAPTER 63, LAWS OF UTAH 1955; RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL 
EMPLOYEES IN MILITARY SERVICE; PROVIDING fHAT STATE 
EMPLOYEES IN THE MILITARY SERVICE SHALL HAVE THEIR MILITARY 
PAY, EXCLUSIVE OF ALLOWANCES, SUPPLEMENTED ONLY UP TO THEIR 
FULL REGULAR SALARY FOR ALL TIME NOT IN EXCESS OF 15 DAYS 
PER YE.\R; PRS:l!BITHJG DECUCTION OF VACATION TIME FOR TIME 
16 SPENT ON ACTIVE DUTY; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE 
17 Be 1t enacted by the Leglslature of the State of Utah: 
18 Section 1. Section 39-1-35, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
19 amended to read: 
25 If the nat1onal 
26 guard of this state 1s called Into the serv1ce of the state or 
27 the Un1ted States, the state shall prov1de for the dependents of 
29 st~te emplJyees who are enlisted members of the nat1onal guard so 
29 called 1nto serv1ce. The board of exam1ners shall cause an 
30 exam1nat1~n tJ be made 1nto the mer1ts of all cases of alleged 
-::e~·.:>nclenc:: th2.t mother, father, 
l' ::jr:~.ndfat~e!:', :j'randmother, wt..:e. s1ster, brother or child of such 
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Substitute 
H. B. No. 18 
member of the nat1onal guard, or any or either of them, are 
4 dependent upou such member for support, the board of examiners 
shall determ1ne the amount to be pa1d by the state to any such 
6 dependent, and shall cause the state auditor to draw his warrant 
on the state treasurer for such sum in favor of such specific 
8 and determined dependents, payable out of any amounts available 
9 for military purposes or for the maintenance and support of the 
10 national guard. If there are not sufficient funds available to 
11 pay for the necessary support of all the dependents determined 
12 and specified by the board of exam1ners, the funds available 
13 shall be prorated among the dependents specified by the board of 
14 examiners. The board of exam1ners in specifying the amounts to 
15 be paid to such dependents may provide for a payment on a weekly 
16 or monthly basis and on such condit1ons as it may deem best in· 
17 each particular case. 
18 Sect1on 2. Sect1on 39-3-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
19 enacted by Chapter 63, Laws of Utah 1955, is amended to read: 
20 39-3-2. All state employees and all employees of any county 
21 and munic1pal1ty thereof who are or shall become members of the 
22 organized reserve of the Un1ted States ta~My;-Aavy;-a~f-€eEee-as8 
23 ~af~Res] armed forces, lncludinq the nat1onal guard of this 
2~ state, shall [se-a±±ewea-!~±±-!'ay] have theu base milituy pay, 
25 exclusive of allowances for hous1ng and subsistence, supplemented 
26 uo to thelr full regular salary for all t1me not in excess of 
27 [!•fteeR] l2 days per year spent on duty at annual encampment or 
28 r1fle competition or other dut1es 1n connection with the Reserve 
29 training and 1nstruct1on requirements of the [aE~y;--RaYy;--a%f 
30 fetee--aR6--ffiaftRes] armed forces of the Un1ted States including 
31 the nat1onal ~uard of thlS state. Th1s leave shall be 1n 
32 add1t1on to annual vacat1cn leave Wlth pay. State employees of 
33 ':he na':.:...onal :Juard of thls state ·..,.ho spend t1me on act1ve duty in 
34 ~~~nrleCtton ~1th Jther dut1es of the nattonal guard not 1n ser?lCe 
-! 
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t: 
H. B. No. 18 
shall not have that add1t1onal t1me deducted from any vacation 
4 those employees may be entitled to. The provisions of this 
section shall apply only to enl1stments and reenlistments 
6 following June 30, 1979. 
7 Section 3. This act shall take effect July 1, 1979. 
-3-
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1 L!-:> ;u·Lioll. 
COM:\IITTEE REPORT COIWECTION 
February 7, 1 !J7!J 
Mr. Speal<er: 
Your Committee on Business, Industrial Development and 
Consumer Concerns, to which was referred H.B. No. 18, by Mr. 
Farnsworth, ct al. PAY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN MlLI-
TAll.Y Sl~RV!CE, hns cnrdully con.,idcrcd said bill ""rl 
rPcommencls that it be deleted in title ancl body and Substitute 
1 1.11. No. IH be inserLL·d in lieu thereof' and reports the same out 
favorably. 
lteport filed. 
SHERMAN D. llARMf<:R 
Chairman 
On motion of Hepresentutive Harmer, the report of the 
Business, lndustrinl Dl'velopmcnt and Consumer Concerns 
Com1niLlee w:ts adopted. 
::iuh»Litute ll.U. No. lH read the second lime by short title, 
lrl'fer to Day :lt, Page ;,:2) Substitute H.H. No. JR was reported in 
crrur. 
CONSIDEHATION OF BILLS 
ON THIRD READING 
H.B. No. 1 R, I'!\ Y FOH PURLIC EMPLOYERS· MILITARY 
SJ•:J(VJCI-: !Tdd Lhc third Linle '"'cl )Jiacecl units l'inul passuge. 
H.B. No. Hl then failecl on lhe following roll call: 
~ Yeas, 22; J'iays, 18; Absent or not voting, 5. 
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28 !lOUSE JOUI\Ni\L 
u Those voting 111 the affirmative were: Ktprcsentativcs: 
Atwood Harrison Pnln·.er 
Brockl>ank Humberstone Richctrds 
Brown McAllister Rogers 
Christiansen McKeachnie Rowe 
Evans Mecham Saunders 
F;nnsworth Olsen Schmutz 
Gardner Pace Wilcox 
Garff 
Those voting in the negative wet·e: Representatives: 
Allred Holbrook Rnw::;on 
Arrington Hollingshaus Redci 
Bangerter Irvine !{eese 
Cannon Johnson Sellcneit 
Christensen Jones Smith 
Davis Jorgensen Starr 
Dmitrich Judd Stepnens 
Doane Leavitt Strong 
Florez LeFevre Sykes 
Fox Livingston Taylor 
Free McMullin Wahlstrom 
Garr Money White, J. 
Harmer Nielsen White, B. 
Harward Peterson, c. Whitesides 
Hawkes l'etcrson, G. Wimmer 
Heslop Peterson, L. Speaker Hansen 
Absent or not voting: Representatives: 
Bishop 
Knowlton 




H.B. No. 88, EDUCATIONAL CEHTIFICi\TES, read the 
third time and placed on its final passage. 
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